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Mezzanine Debt and Preferred
Equity in Real Estate
~?REW R. BERMAN

.
essor of Law and Director, Center for Real Estate Studies, New York Law School

INtRooucTION

~e

:
last 10 years, the commercial real estate market has witnessed drastic changes
that ~;'pes .and volume of nontraditional financing methods. Before the recession
tradif gan ~ late 2007, unprecedented growth took place in two types of nonestatei~nal financing: mezzanine debt and preferred equity. During that time, real
el<ceed orrowers had easy access to capital with loan-to-value ratios that sometimes
fees f ed the value of the property, and lenders could earn high interest rates and
sion ~rn these riskier financings. In the years following the 2008 recession recesdarcts owever, traditional mortgage lenders imposed tighter underwriting stanavau;b~d re~l estate owners and developers competed for the limited sources of

l'his proe ~ap1ta l. As a resu lt, the n

d for alt m a tiv funding sourc

incr ased .

Provid ~id~d . an opportunity for a new group of lenders to enter the market to
hedge ~qu1d1ty and additional capital. These nonbank financial institutions and
lunin ds (many with billions of dollars under management) looked for opporately ; s ; 0 P.rovide real estate financing during the volatile time period immedi1
tinue to owing Lehman's collapse and the ensuing financial meltdown and con0 do so now
.
w1.th
could b ~ezzanine debt and preferred equity investments, real estate owners
0
fllnds tam much needed capital, and nonbank financial institutions and hedge
these r~O~ld enter the finance markets and earn high interest rates and fees from
these iskier and nontradition al financings. Real estate investors and scholars view
l!lajor nontradi~ional financings (i.e., preferred equity and mezzanine debt) as a
owne :Vay t~ fill the "financing gap" between the senior mortgage debt and the
~Pes ~; equity. !~s chapter discusses the risks and opportuniti~s of these two
1
hvely 10ntrad1ttonal real estate financings. It also exammes how mvestors effecand p ~anage the inherent risks of, and create opportunities with, mezzanine loans
~~erred equity investmen ts.
and d is ~apter is organized as follows. The first part focuses on mezzanine loans
"With ~s~ribes the legal and economic structure of mezzanine financings, along
Second e investment opportunities, and the business risks, of mezz~e loans. The
Part focuses on preferred equity investments and also exarmnes the legal
163
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'th th .
sttnent
and economic structure of these equity investments, along w1
e inve
opportunities and risks of preferred equity.

MEZZANINE LOANS

In the real estate industry, mezzanine financing is a type of secured loan ~~ere ~;
1
lender's collateral consists of the borrower's equity interests in other entities. W,
a traditional mortgage loan, the borrower owns the underlying income-producltl~
real estate itself and grants the lender a mortgage lien on the property. Howe~e ~
a mezzanine loan is not directly secured by real estate because the mezzanltliborrower does not actually own any income-producing property or other tangbble assets. Mezzanine borrowers typically only own equity interests in oti:er su al
sidiary entities, and these subsidiaries actually own the income-producing r~ s
estate. From both an economic and legal perspective, Berman (2007, p. 99~) s~a ~
that the "value of the mezzanine borrower's collateral derives solely from its 1tl
rect ownership of the underlying mortgaged property."
. . rMezzanine borrowers typically pledge as collateral all of their equity wt~
ests in the underlying subsidiaries that control, directly or indirectly, the mo 0 f
gage borrower and the ultimate owner of the underlying real property. Because _
this unique legal structure, Fisch, Freidus, and McOwen (2011) explain that me\
zanine lenders are structurally superior to equity holders of the borrower, bU~e
the same time they are structurally subordinate to the senior mortgage lender.
me~z~ine loan is situa~ed between the more secure senior ~ortg~ge ~oan and·sl<S
equity investors. The highly leveraged mezzanine loan brings with 1t both ri _
and rewards for the parties. The following sections discuss the investment oppor
tunities and risks of mezzanine lending in real estate.

we

Mezzanine Loans: Investment Opportunities

The growth of mezzanine loans is to some extent directly linked to the grow~
of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). In 2009, national credit ra ~
ing a?encies s~ch as Standard~ Poor's and Moody's required that any i:nortg~g
loan incl~~ed in a CMBS offering pro~bit the mortgage borrower from mcurrthiS
any additional mortgage debt on the income-producing property. Because of bY
requir~ment, Ru~in (200~) expl~in~ that ~e underwriting guid~lines issued ult,
the rating agencies effectively eliminated Junior mortgage financing. As a res e
the market demanded other types of financing to fill the gap left by the absen~
of junior mortgages. Lefcoe (2009) explains that mezzanine financing became d
attractive form of financing, quickly replacing traditional junior mortgages ~ e
growing exponentially. According to Rubock (2007), the amount of mezz~ 5
loans included in commercial real estate (CRE) collateralized debt obliga~~ntl
0
(CDO), for example, increased from just a few million dollars to over $3 billi
annuall~

z·

Mezzanine loans are also popular with real estate owners because manY Ille ts
zanine lenders offer accrual features that defer portions of the interest paytllenre
until the mezzanine loan reaches maturity (balloon payment). The unique structu0 5,
of this loan reduces the burden on current cash flow and consequently has a P e
itive effect on the borrower's debt coverage ratios. Furthermore, senior mortgag
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lenders frequently permit borrowers to obtain mezzanine loans because the loan
~ro.ceeds often provide the required capital for property improvements and renoc a:;ons, and these renovations increase the market value of the mortgage lender's
ateral. Consequently, real estate owners and developers often seek mezzanine
1
c~ans to replace traditional junior mortgages and to provide the required capital to
ose the financing gap between the senior mortgage debt and common equity.

°

Leverage

~ec~ntly, senior mortgage lenders have adopted conservative lending practices,

( ~~mg borrowers with lower loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Fass, Shaff, and Zief
2
ciaI l) ma~tain that as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and the finanhi hregulations that have since been adopted, lending practices now also require
in~o er de~t. coverage ratios (DCR). The DCR represents a property's net oper~~g
adct·ll_le divided by the annual debt service. Because owners are reluctant to miect
Vid ihonal equity into projects, Saft (2011a) contends that mezzanine loans probe ~these owners with capital to increase their LTV ratios without further encumlll rmg ~e property with an additional mortgage. Saft also states that although a
agezz~e lender is technically a secured creditor of the borrowing entity, credit
of enci.es and senior mortgage holders generally treat mezzanine loans as a form
levequity rather than debt, thereby permitting borrowers to increase their financial
erage.
dit· Arnold (2011a) provides that mezzanine loans require higher yields than tra•
•
por
ex ionai 1· UtUor
mortgages because the collateral is a "weaker" form of security.
lll~ple, Arnold (2011b) asserts that the rapid growth of mezzanine loans in comhig~ial real estate finance has caused lenders to assume more risk in exchange for
hav returns. As Duell (2012) observes, mezzanine loan transactions frequently
state Jnternal rates of return (IRR) in excess of 20 percent. Dehncke-McGill (2012)
Pro es that mezzanine lenders' target rates of return fluctuate with the quality of the
Ille per~ and the stability of their cash flows. In determining the necessary IRR for
lenz~anme loan transactions, lenders consider the property location, rating, and
g of tenant leases, rental income, and the amount of equity at risk.

e:

Matu.
In th rrty of Existing Debt
.
Ods ~past, mezzanine loans successfully provided real estate investors with methor n ~organize their capital structure without "watering down" their equity
20Q6egahvely affecting the senior debt. Duell (2012) states that "[b]oth 2005 and
Year Were big years for conduit lending, and most of those loans had seven to 10$2.s :~r~s·".Lee (2011) provides empirical evidence showing that approximately
anct rillion !-1' commercial real estate mortgages will be maturing between 2~12
a lar2020, with nearly $1.8 trillion in debt maturing between 2012 and 2015. With
few ge Volume of original senior mortgage debt set to mature within the next
gati Years, property owners need financing sources to refinance their debt oblinityofns and fund the gap between debt and equity. Analysts foresee an opportuthes 0 r mezzanine lenders to provide owners with additional capital to refinance
e 1oans.
lenctln the next several years, many opportunities will be available for mezzanine
ers and borrowers. In describing a recent transaction, Commercial Mortgage

°
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Alert (2012) illustrates some of the benefits of combining mezzanine loans and preferred equity investments along with traditional senior secured mortgages:
The 1,013-room property, called Pare 55 Wyndham, has $211.5 million of outs~a~d
ing debt that matured yesterday. The Rockpoint team is trying to pay it off by l~~ng
up a $90 million senior mortgage, $60 million of mezzanine debt and .$5~ rrulhon
of preferred equity. It would also kick in about $10 million of fresh equity itsel!· · · ·
As Rockpoint scrambles to arrange fresh financing, high-yield investors are 1.o~k
eying to buy the existing junior mezzanine debt on the hotel, in order to position
themselves to take a run at the property if the refinancing fails. Market pros v~lue
the hotel at $210 million to $220 million, meaning that the Rockpoint team has little
or no equity remaining in the property.

As this example illustrates, the mezzanine borrower can use the loan proceeds
to meet certain financial and legal obligations under the existing senior mortg~ge
and to limit the amount of cash equity at stake. Furthermore, the mezzanine len er
earns high interest rates while at the same time holding collateral. However, ~e
collateral is actually the mezzanine borrower's equity interests in the underlying
entity that indirectly owns the income producing property.

Shifting the Risk through Securitization
.
Berman (2005) states that the growth in mortgage securitizations led to the creat~on
of new real estate financing options, such as mezzanine loans and preferred equity·
Similarly, Hughes (2011) asserts that the rise in mezzanine loans has been a £unction of the growth in securitization itself. Lenders use securitized mezzanine loans
to raise money through the capital markets in order to fund additional loans to
borrowers. Although mezzanine lenders typically experience the first dolla~ l?ss
if a borrower defaults, mezzanine lenders protect their credit position by sh~.tlll~
the risk to secondary market investors through securitization. Because securit1ze
mortgage facilities prohibit borrowers from acquiring junior mortgages, the s~uc
ture of mezzanine loans provides borrowers with extra capital without negatively
affecting the credit rating of the senior mortgage.
Furthermore, Rubock (2007, p. 1) states that, "[b]ecause of the CRE CDO alternative, mezzanine loans now have a natural capital market and Moody's rates
them in their own right, not viewing them merely as an impediment to higher rat·
ing on the senior secured debt." Thus, by packaging mezzanine loans in diver~e
securitization pools, lenders can shift the risks of real estate projects to investors it\
the secondary market and raise funds to finance additional real estate projects.

UCC Article 9 and Title Insurance
As Berman (2007) discusses, mezzanine lenders oft~n find it difficult to enforc~
their rights and remedies if borrowers default. However, Rubock (2007) notes tha
mezzanine loans have distinct advantages compared to mortgage financing. for
instance, a foreclosure of the collateral in a mezzanine loan under the Uniforl'Jl
Commercial Code (UCC) is considerably quicker than a mortgage foredos~re·
Further, with a speedy mezzanine loan foreclosure, highly capitalized mezzanine
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:nd.e7s can inject funds into distressed properties more easily and quickly than
ad1honal junior mortgage lenders.
Although mezzanine loan foreclosures are relatively quick, lenders still face
Ill.any risks because of the unique nature of mezzanine loan collateral. Because the
rnezzanme lender's collateral (i.e., the equity interest in the mortgage borrower) is
techn·ically considered personal property, the UCC governs the foreclosure process
~ther than traditional mortgage law. As a result, Fisch and Simkin (2008) explain
at the mezzanine lender's legal interests in the equity collateral need to be properly "perfected" under applicable UCC law.

llcc Article 9
Prendergast (2011) confirms that since mezzanine lender's collateral is considered
personal property under state law, Articles 8 and/ or 9 of the UCC applies depending on certain circumstances. Berman (2007) states that mezzanine lenders need to
ensure "attachment" and "perfection" of the security interest in the lender's collat~ral in order to protect the lender's right to foreclose upon a default. With proper
~gal drafting, a mezzanine lender can easily structure the transaction so that Artie e 8 of the UCC governs these issues, and the lender can physically take possession
~d control of the "stock" certificate evidencing the equity serving as collateral.
the alternative, the lender's collateral may be classified as a "general tangible"
~de~ Article 9. Under this provision of the UCC, the secured lender perfects its
~cunty interest in the "general intangible" by filing a UCC-1 financing statement
S ~e state where the debtor and collateral are located. In either case, according to
~t (20lla), once the security interest is created, attached, and perfected, mezzathire lenders' lien priority and collateral interest are generally superior to that of
d-party lien holders.
h If Article 8 of the UCC does not govern the transaction, disputes with other lien
~e1d~rs may arise because the determination of priority is based on the" first to file"
ti financing statement. Consequently, Berman (2007, p. 1004) asserts that perfec0
h by possession or control typically" ensures a first priority lien over another lien
der who previously perfected by filing a financing statement even if the later
8
zec~red party knew of the filing by the previous secured lender." As a result, mezo~e lenders often manage these risks by requiring, as a condition to the issuance
Ph : loan, that the mezzanine borrower opt-in to Article 8 of the UCC and deliver
Ysical control of the certificates to the mezzanine lender.

f

°

'1'it1e I nsurance
In

tit W.hat began as an attempt to mitigate the risks associated with perfecting secuz~terests, mezzanine lenders now routinely require borrowers to obtain mezth . e loan title insurance. Mezzanine lenders want to ensure that the quality of
0 ~ title to the underlying property is free and clear from undisclosed liens and
bo er defects. Typically, the closing of the mezzanine loan is conditioned upon the
ga rrower' s delivery of a special endorsement to the existing title policy of the mort'Wi~ borr?wer. Consequently, the endorsement provides the mezzanine lender
bo the right to receive payments otherwise payable to the underlying mortgage
rrower.
i\rrMezzanme lenders also frequently obtain "title" protection under UCC
tcle 9. With this relatively new title insurance product, m ezzanine lenders are

168

Alternative Investments

insured against defects in the attachment, perfection, and priority of the lender's
lien in the mezzanine loan collateral. The most important protection that a mezzanine lender receives from this type of title policy, however, is that the title company
will pay for all legal fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the defense of the lend~r ls
security interest in the collateral. Murray and Scott (2006) assert that these
insurance products help insure the quality of the mezzanine borrower's collater ·

ti::

Intercreditor Agreement between the Senior Mortgage Lender
and the Mezzanine Lender
The intercreditor agreement is the most important document governing the r~la·
tionship between the senior mortgage lender and the subordinate mezzantll~
lender because it governs the parties' respective rights and liabilities in the even
of default under the mortgage or mezzanine loan. Although the senior mortgag~
lender may seriously affect the value of the mezzanine lender's collateral, the rneZ
zanine lender can defend against some of these risks with various protections c~n
tained in an intercreditor agreement. Fawer and Waters (2007) state that mezzanllle
lenders typically modify the standard intercreditor agreement so that the rnezza·
nine lender has (1) the right to receive notice of mortgage default and the oppor·
tunity to cure defaults, (2) the right to foreclose on its collateral, (3) the right. t~
purchase the senior mortgage loan, and (4) approval rights over material rnodifi·
cations of the senior loan.
Right to Receive Default Notices and Cure Defaults
Mezzanine lenders typically require the senior mortgage lender to send theJll
notices of any material default. After receiving a default notice, a mezzanine lender
has only a short period of time to decide whether to remedy the default under
the mortgage loan. If the default is not remedied, however, the mezzanine lende~
might lose the value of its collateral because a mortgage foreclosure would resul_
in the sale of the underlying mortgaged property to the successful bidder at fo~
~losure. ~!though the ~ezz~~e borrower would still technically own the equi~
interests in the underlymg entities, these entities will no longer own the mortgage
property.
Under a typical intercreditor agreement mezzanine lenders often have the
'
·or
same time p~ri~d as the mortgage borrower to cure any defaults under the sent e·
mortgage. Fileti (2012) contends that the standard form of the intercreditor agre .
ment provides "stand-still obligations" on the senior lender following a def~U1
under the senior loan. For mezzanine lenders these provisions provide a r1gh
'
to cure monetary and nonmonetary defaults before
the senior mortgage lender
takes any enforcement actions, including mortgage foreclosure. Arnold (201la, P·
2) contends that, "senior lenders [might] welcome the role of the mezzanine lend~r,
[because mezzanine lenders] have an incentive to cure defaults by the borrowe;, ~
order to prevent a foreclosure and any resulting loss to the mezzanine lender.
me~zanine lender will generally o~ly exercise its right to cure defaults under ~~
semor mortgag: wh~n the underlying property's value is greater than the sUlll of
all the outstanding liens on the property or if they believe they can take control
the property and increase its value.

!
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Right to Foreclose
;;1'e mezzanine lender's primary remedy is the right to foreclose the mezzanine
orrower's pledged equity interests. The ability to exercise this remedy depends
1
~rgely on how broadly the relevant intercreditor agreement defines the term Qual1 ed Transferee. Fawer and Austin (2011, p. 2) argue that the "more broadly the
term 'Qualified Transferee' is defined, the more liquid the mezzanine loan and the
pledged equity become." At the minimum, therefore, the mezzanine lender needs
to be a Qualified Transferee so that if the mezzanine lender is the winning bidder
ft a foreclosure sale, this lender would be protected against the senior mortgage
ender challenging the transfer of equity and related change of control. Further~ore, mezzanine lenders ought to protect against the risk that a successful UCC
oreclosure will trigger a "due-on-sale" clause under the senior mortgage (because
:ost mortgages define a "sale" to include a change of control of the mortgage
0 rrower).

~ight to Purchase the Senior Loan
a default exists and the senior mortgage loan has been accelerated, mezzanine
1
(;nders usually have the right to purchase the senior mortgage. Fawer and Austin
O~l) contend that mezzanine lenders ought to have the option to purchase the
senior mortgage after a default until some outside date after the senior mortgagee
conunences its mortgage foreclosure. Accordingly, mezzanine lenders typically
~sure a "right of first refusal" on the senior mortgage at a price that is equal to
e outstanding amount due under the mortgage, but that does not require the
lllezzanine lender to pay any late fees, default interest, or prepayment penalties
llnder the senior loan.

~ezzanine Lender's Rights and Remedies upon
0 rrower

Default

When a default occurs under the mezzanine loan but there is no default under the
senior mortgage, a mezzanine lender's primary remedy is generally to foreclose
~n the pledged security interest and take over ownership rights of the underlying
roperty. Although Article 9 of the UCC requires a foreclosure sale to be "com:ercially reasonable," requiring delivery of notice and standard marketing procef Ures, Fisch et al. (2011) state that mezzanine lenders can usually complete a UCC
0
reclosure sale in 60 days or less.
~order to protect their rights after a foreclosure, mezzanine lenders normally
restrict the mezzanine borrower's right to cause the mortgage borrower to pre~' modify, refinance, or grant additional collateral to the senior mortgage lender.
1 s restriction helps to protect mezzanine lenders from changes under the senior
oan that could inhibit the mezzanine lender's remedies. Similarly, Fileti (2011) rec~~ends that the mezzanine lender should perform extensive due diligence of
an material contracts relating to the property and/ or the mortgage borrower as
Other safeguard, because after foreclosure the mezzanine lender, in essence, will
0
Wn and control the property entity subject to those agreements.
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As a practical matter, Fass et al. (2011) state that when there are defaults under
both the senior mortgage and the mezzanine loan, the mezzanine lender's principal options are to either remedy the default under the senior mortgage or to purchase the mortgage loan. Berman (2007, p. 1022) contends that most senior mortgage loans provide for some type of purchase option. Mezzanine lenders also face
the risk that foreclosure of the mezzanine loan collateral would trigger the "due
on transfer" clause under the senior mortgage. As discussed previously, senior
mortgage documents typically restrict transfers of the equity in the mortgage borrower or the transfer of the underlying real property. Thus, mezzanine lenders
typically draft provisions protecting against the risk that any changes in control
of the borrower will not trigger any "due on transfer" clauses under the senior
mortgage.

Protection against Bankruptcy Risks
Some risk exists that the mezzanine or mortgage borrower might file for or become
subject to an involuntary bankruptcy. In these cases, there are substantial risks of
substantive consolidation, the imposition of the automatic stay limiting the mezzanine lender's ability to act, and the setting aside of pre-bankruptcy transactions
as "fraudulent" transfers. In response to these risks, mezzanine lenders generally require that the mezzanine borrower is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose
entity (SPE). Fisch et al. (2011) contend that in a bankruptcy of the mezzanine borrower, the mezzanine lender would typically be able to obtain relief from the automatic stay and exercise its rights and remedies.

INVESTMENT RISKS OF MEZZANINE LOANS
As discussed in the previous section, mezzanine loans offer tremendous investment opportunities in today's commercial real estate market. However, if care
is not taken, mezzanine lenders might suffer the financial consequences of these
risky investments, especially because mezzanine loans do not have many of the
typical mortgage protections. Berman (2007) contends that mezzanine lenders
often lack protections customary to mortgages. For example, mortgage lenders
have the following rights: to appoint a receiver, to protect against waste, and
to foreclose the borrower's equity of redemption. In addition, basic property
law ensures that a mortgage lien will bind future owners of the mortgaged
property.
The investment risks involved with mezzanine loan transactions generally
occur at four points in time: (1) prior to the origination of the mezzanine loan when
the parties assess leverage, the response of the securitization market, and the relative costs and benefits of the investment ("high-yield" issues); (2) at the point
of creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest in, and the economic
evaluation of, the mezzanine loan collateral; (3) when negotiating the intercreditor
agreement with the senior mortgage lender; and (4) when the mezzanine borrower
defaults and the mezzanine lender needs to enforce its remedies. This section discusses in greater detail these investment risks.
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Leverage, Securitization, and High-Yield Issues
According to Duell (2012), one of the biggest impediments to a robust mezzanine
l~nding market in 2011 was the high price of mezzanine money. As a result, mezzanme lenders responded to stagnant market conditions by offering accrual/balloon
payment options and by lowering their interest rates somewhat. Nevertheless,
even lower interest rates have not overcome hesitations to incur further debt
obligations.
. In the basic mezzanine loan transaction, the mezzanine lender is often subject to .the liens of the senior mortgage. Berman (2007, p. 999) asserts that "[s]ince
only the bottom-tiered entity (the mortgage borrower) actually owns real property,
the mezzanine borrower's entire net worth, cash flow, and value of its collateral is
d~rived solely from its (direct or indirect) equity in the entity that owns the underlymg income-producing property." Accordingly, even if a mezzanine lender has a
rerf~cted security interest in the mezzanine borrowing entity, a mezzanine lender
is still junior to any liens that the mortgage borrower has incurred. Thus, if the
cash. flows from a real estate project are insufficient to cover the borrowers' debt
service, the mezzanine lender will absorb the financial loss before any other mortgage lenders.
,, Furthermore, Moody's rating agency views securitized mezzanine loans as a
Weaker" form of security than the traditional second mortgage. Rubock (2007,
p. 7) asserts that "Moody's views [mezzanine loans] as having a lesser negative
effect on the senior debt, and therefore logically it must bear a greater portion of
the .expected losses when the total loan leverage defaults." Consequently, in a sitU~hon where the mezzanine loan is structured with multiple tranches, the mezza~e ~ender at the bottom tranche will be forced to either inject more capital into
e distressed project or walk away from a failed investment.

Title and Collateral Risks
Mezzanine loans also carry special title risks because the mezzanine lender's collateral consists of equity, which is legally classified as personal property, rather than
the typical real estate collateral with a mortgage loan. Because the lender's ability
~o foreclose upon personal property collateral depends on adherence to a different
. ody of law, the mezzanine lender needs to take additional precautions to enforce
its remedies and foreclose on its collateral.
As discussed previously, mezzanine lenders often require mezzanine borrow~rs to "opt-in" to Article 8 under the UCC in order ensure that the collateral
ecomes a "security" under Article 8 and an "investment property" under Article
9
.. If mezzanine lenders do not require this further protection, the security interest
is merely considered a "general intangible" under UCC Article 9. As a result, the
evaluation of mezzanine loan collateral differs somewhat from ordinary real estate
collateral in a mortgage loan.

Limitations on Rights and Remedies under
the Intercreditor Agreement

~rrnan (2007, p. 1018) contends that "mezzanine loans are also typically contracally subordinated to the related senior mortgage loans pursuan_t to the terms of
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an intercreditor agreement entered into between the senior mortgage lender and
the mezzanine lender." The intercreditor agreement severely limits and restricts the
ability of the mezzanine lender to foreclose or enforce some of the rights under the
mezzanine loan. Steiner and Samton (2011) assert that mortgagees and mezzanine
lenders often have disagreements if the "value of the [underlying] property drops
to or below the amount of the outstanding first mortgage loan, as a result leaving the mezzanine lender with a de facto unsecured debt to a company that, in all
likelihood, has no other assets." Accordingly, frequent conflicts and sometimes litigation occur if the underlying property becomes distressed and insufficient income
is available to cover the annual debt service.

Limitations to the Right to Cure
One of the most important limitations provided in the intercreditor agreement is
the provision that the mezzanine lender is required to remedy all defaults under
the senior mortgage before initiating a foreclosure action against the mezzanine
borrower. In Bank of America, N.A. v. PSW NYC LLC (commonly referred to as the
"Stuyvesant Town" case), the New York Supreme Court prohibited the mezzanine
lender from foreclosing on the borrower's pledged equity without first curing or
repaying the outstanding indebtedness under the senior mortgage. The court's
decision was based on its interpretation of the "Foreclosure of Separate Collateral" provision under the intercreditor agreement. The court held in the Stuyvesant
Town case, similar to Highland Park CDO I Granter Trust, Series Av. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., that because the senior mortgage had been accelerated, "[the] Intercreditor
Agreement bars [junior lender] from recovering on the mezzanine loan until the
senior loan is repaid in full."
The Stuyvesant Town case clarifies that a mezzanine lender needs to understand and adhere to all of the express obligations under the intercreditor agreement
before it takes any remedial action against the borrower. Furthermore, a mezzanine
lender is likely to expend an enormous amount of resources to protect its interest in the event of a default under the senior mortgage. Fawer and Austin (2011,
p. 2) claim that "[m]ezzanine lenders should therefore strive to avoid any limitation on the exercise of their right to foreclose, and to make sure that any such foreclosure should never be an event of default under the terms of the senior loan."
Accordingly, mezzanine lenders should negotiate provisions that permit a foreclosure of the mezzanine collateral before being required to cure any defaults under
the senior mortgage.
Transfer Restrictions
Intercreditor agreements also usually require that the mortgage borrower be controlled by (and that the mezzanine or mortgage collateral can only be transferred
to) a "Qualified Transferee" (QT). A definition of a QT often includes the mezzanine lender itself and an institutional investor who meets minimum "net worth"
or "liquid asset" requirements. Prendergast (2011, p. 20) contends that "[a] breach
of this requirement by selling to a purchaser that does not meet the standard will
probably result in a default under the senior mortgage debt thereby shifting the
bargaining power to the senior lender." The QT restrictions limit the availability
of potential purchasers of the mezzanine collateral at a foreclosure sale, thereby
making the collateral less liquid and potentially less valuable.
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Replacement Guaranty
In g~neral, most senior mortgage holders will negotiate a provision in the intercred1tor agreement requiring the mezzanine lender, in the event of a mezzanine
loan foreclosure and subsequent purchase of the mezzanine collateral, to provide
a replacement guarantor under the senior loan. The theory behind the replacement guaranty is based on the fact that mortgage borrowers are usually obligated
:der the senior loan to guaranty the loan, assuming any liabilities for acts that the
orrower has committed, such as fraud and misrepresentation. If the mezzanine
1ender purchases the mezzanine collateral at a UCC sale, and steps in as the owner
of the mortgage borrower, parties often disagree whether the mezzanine lender
(ne~ mortgage borrower) should be obligated to replace the guarantor under the
senior loan. Steiner and Samton (2011) explain the issues that mortgagees face if
mezzanine lenders do not replace the guaranty under the senior loan:
The concern and uncertainty that many mortgage lenders are facing is the ability to
enforce such guarantees if a mezzanine lender has foreclosed and, therefore, controls the mortgage borrower. The guarantor, who is no longer in control of the bor:ower, would argue that the clear intention of the non-recourse carve-out guaranty
is to hold the individual (or equity owner) that makes decisions on behalf of the
borrower liable if such borrower commits a proscribed act. If, however, the guarantor is no longer in control of the mortgage borrower (after a mezzanine foreclosure)
when, for example, it files for protection under bankruptcy laws, will a court still
hold such guarantor to the obligations of the guaranty?

~mitations to Rights and Remedies Upon a Mezzanine Borrower Default
. e mezzanine lender often has difficulty foreclosing on the borrower's equity
interests after an event of default. This difficulty arises because of the need to
co:1'ply strictly with the UCC, including the provision stating that foreclosure
sa es must be commercially reasonable. Mezzanine lenders are also sometimes
~~tricted. by limitations set forth in the intercreditor agreement, as well as cer~ requirements set by the rating agencies. As a result, mezzanine lenders are
0
ten under tremendous time pressure to exercise their remedies before the senior
~~rt,?age holder completes a mortgage foreclosure. Berman (2007, p. 1023) ass~rts
t [o]nce the senior mortgage lender completes its foreclosure, the underlying
mortgage borrower will no longer own the income-producing property, and the
mezzanine borrower will own equity in an entity with no assets."
shi Moreover, because the mezzanine lender does not have a d~ect l~gal rela~on
th P to the land, mezzanine lenders generally do not have any drrect rights against
ti e mortgage borrower or its equity owners for monetary defaults. Even in situa8.ons Where the mezzanine lender can foreclose on the pledged equity interests, it
ltnply steps into the shoes of the equity owners of the underlying mortgage bor:wer. The mezzanine lender is, therefore, in no better position than the previous
st ort~age ?orrower-it is still subject to the existin~ senior mo~tgage, other o~t
l anding liens, and real estate taxes. Unlike the senior mortgage, the mezzanme
~der has no special right to foreclose on any of these other liens and interests
~:ched. to the underlying property. Frequently, the mezzanine lende~'s only true
t edy is to refinance the property subject to any prepayment penalties pursuant
0
the senior mortgage or to buy out the senior lender at par value.
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Another potential risk that mezzanine lenders face, in the event of a default
under the mezzanine loan, is a "cash sweep" under the senior loan. Rubin (2009,
p. 42) describes a cash sweep as a provision "that permits the mortgage lender to
trap all cash flow from the property to pay its debt, property expenses and fund
reserves, leaving little or no money to pay the [mezzanine] lender."

Commercially Reasonable
If a mezzanine lender seeks to foreclose on its equity collateral, it must comply with
many of the provisions of UCC Article 9 and sell the collateral either at a private or
public sale. Berman (2007, p. 1016) contends that mezzanine lenders cannot effectively dispose of the collateral at a private sale, "[s]ince there is no established mar·
ket, no standardized price quotations, and mezzanine loan collateral is extremely
complicated." Thus, mezzanine lenders cannot "buy" the collateral itself at a pri·
vate sale because mezzanine loans are not the type of collateral customarily sold
on a recognized market or subject to standardized price quotations.
As a result, mezzanine lenders will typically have to sell the pledged collateral
at a public sale. However, even a public sale can result in formidable risks because
no established market is available for this type of collateral. Accordingly, mezzanine lenders are often left with no choice other than to "buy" the collateral at the
public foreclosure sale.
Under UCC § 9-610, the transferability of collateral at a public sale must be
"commercially reasonable." Furthermore, some jurisdictions also require lenders
to prove that the public disposition of the mezzanine collateral was "commercially
reasonable" in order to claim a deficiency judgment. One risk is that some doubt
still exists about the exact meaning of "commercially reasonable" in this context.
UCC § 9-627 provides that "a disposition of collateral is 'commercially reasonable'
if it is made: in the usual manner on any recognized market; at the price current in
any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or otherwise in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that
was the subject of the disposition." The risk for mezzanine lenders is that, other
than the two statutes cited above, the UCC provides little guidance on what con·
stitutes a commercially reasonable sale.
If the foreclosure sale does not meet the requirements for "commercial rea·
sonableness," then the borrower or guarantor may sue the mezzanine lender or
be released from any recourse liability. Consequently, mezzanine lenders ought to
ensure that they have complied with these provisions.
Bankruptcy and Workout Risks
In general, the mortgage lender will take action to forbid the mezzanine lender

from becoming a secured creditor of the property owner (mortgage borrower).
Berg and Gogliomella (2010) contend that so long as an outstanding senior mort·
gage loan exists, the mezzanine lender is prohibited from causing or influencing
the senior borrower to file for bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings. Rubin
(2009) asserts that if the property owner files for bankruptcy, the mezzanine lender
typically would not hold a claim to the property owner's assets and would not
have voting rights regarding reorganization plans.
In effect, should a plan for reorganization require a transfer of the property
from the property owner, the mezzanine lender could be left owning equity in a
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~orthless entity. Berg and Goliomella (2010) conclude that if the mezzanine lender
18
• treated

as a creditor in the bankruptcy of the mortgage borrower, the mezza-

~me lender will be prohibited from taking any action in the bankruptcy proceed-

111g without the senior lender's consent, and the senior lender will be authorized
~o exercise its remedial power against junior creditors. Thus, in order to protect
~ts collateral interest in the borrowing entity, the mezzanine lender might need to
mvest additional capital into the mortgage borrower for a workout or, alternatively,
negotiate a purchase of the mortgagee's interests.

PREFERRED EQUITY
Preferred equity is another type of nontraditional real estate financing used by
property owners to obtain additional capital. Unlike mezzanine loans, where a
clear creditor I debtor relationship exists, preferred equity transactions are not
structured as debt. Rather, in a preferred equity transaction the investor/lender
makes a capital contribution in a special-purpose entity (borrower). This entity normally owns the underlying income-producing real property and is also the mortgage borrower. Fisch et al. (2011) assert that due to restrictions set forth in standard
sen.i~r mortgages, preferred equity transactions are most often made to borrowing
entities that indirectly own the underlying property (instead of the mortgage borrower entity itself).
. In exchange for its capital contribution, the investor becomes an equity owner
m the mortgage borrower with special "preferred" rights. As Berman (2005) notes,
these rights often include: (1) the right to receive a special (or preferred) rate of
~e~n:1 on its capital investment and (2) the right to an accelerated repayment of
~ts m1tial capital contribution. In effect, the preferred rate of return reflects the
~terest component of a conventional loan, and the accelerated repayment of the
~vestor's capital is analytically similar to the repayment of outstanding principal
ma loan.
.
As structured, preferred equity investors ("preferred members") are structurally subordinate to all of the borrower's creditors (secured and unsecured) but
~e. senior to common equity owners ("common members"). Fisch et al. (2011, p. 1)
~ aim that the biggest difference between the structure of mezzanine loans and preerred equity investments is that:
UJn general, investments intended to have a simple structure with current payments of interest and a fixed maturity date (with or without extension options) are
usually structured as mezzanine loans, while investments with more complicated
features, such as a cash distribution "waterfall" that allows the owner I developer
to receive some cash flow distributions while the junior capital is still outstanding,
or the capital provider sharing in the "upside" on top of its promised return, lend
themselves more readily to a preferred equity structure.

th Further, preferred members do not have any foreclosure rights, and typically

e borrower or borrowing entity does not pledge its equity interests or other assets
as collateral. Instead, preferred members have superior contractual rights (com~ared to the common equity investors) with respect to cash distributions or diviend payments. Preferred members also have specific contract remedies set forth
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in the organizational documents of the entity in the event of a financial delinquency
or a "Change of Control Event," which is discussed in the next section.
Preferred equity investments are commonly made when senior mortgage
lenders prohibit mortgage borrowers from incurring any further debt. Arnold
(2011c) asserts that preferred equity investments are also used when "a property is
generating insufficient cash flow to service a junior or mezzanine loan." Although
investing in distressed property carries high risks, the structure of preferred equity
transactions allows for capital to be injected into these properties without incurring
additional debt obligations. Saft (2011b) contends that because preferred equity
investors acquire direct equity ownership with the property, they can better protect their capital investment and perhaps obtain higher rates of return if a project
is successful. The next section discusses the opportunities and risks of preferred
equity investments in real estate.

Preferred Equity Opportunities
As discussed previously, a preferred equity investor usually makes a capital contribution in the underlying mortgage borrower or a newly formed borrowing entity
that indirectly owns the underlying income-producing property. Saft (2011b, p. 1)
states that preferred equity transactions have "typically [been] structured as joint
venture transactions between the property owner and a capital provider, who enter
into an agreement with each other to form ... a limited liability company." In return
for its investment, a preferred equity investor receives preferred equity interests
with a preferred return, while the other equity investors receive common equity
interests with no preferred return.
Preferred members also normally receive any cash distributions or dividend
payments before any common equity members. Arnold (2011c) asserts that the
right to receive a preferred distribution-at times as much as 18 percent--on the
invested equity amount is a key aspect of preferred equity transactions. Although
preferred members (as equity) take subordinate positions to all secured and unsecured creditors of the mortgage borrower, preferred members are able to collect
high rates of returns, especially when the underlying property is profitable. Furthermore, if the property is underperforming, the preferred member might have
the right to take over control of the mortgaged property, or the right to remove
voting and control privileges from the common member.

Right to Receive Regular Dividend Payments
Arnold (2011c) states that real estate investors who are seeking higher rates of
return and who are not overly concerned with exit strategies can structure their
senior equity position as a "preferred equity member." Although preferred equity
transactions can be structured in a variety of ways, a preferred member will usually receive, in exchange for its capital contribution, a preferred rate of return on its
investment and an accelerated repayment of its capital. Accordingly, a preferred
member normally receives cash payments before any common equity member
(property owner). Thus, a preferred member generally receives the repayment of
its initial investment before any other equity members and also receives a preferred
rate of return. Moreover, if a real estate project is profitable, a preferred member
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may also receive a percentage of the excess cash flow, thereby sharing in any upside
appreciation.
w .In ?eneral, the organizational documents provide the preferred rate of return,
hich is expressed as an annual rate and accrues from the time of the preferred
~ember's initial capital contribution. A common method of cash flow distribution
lS th
e waterfall" method. The waterfall method generally provides the common
~d preferred members with a distribution structure for any available cash flow
; ter all debt obligations and operating expenses have been paid. According to
PYksma (2011), a typical preferred equity waterfall distributes available cash flow
as follows:
/1

•

• First, to the preferred member in satisfaction of the preferred return on the
preferred member's equity investment.
• Second, to the preferred member in an amount sufficient to return the preferred member's initial equity investment (capital contribution).
• Third, to the common member in an amount sufficient to return the common
member's capital contributions.
• Finally, the balance of any available cash will be distributed between the
preferred member and the common member according to a predetermined
percentage.
f

This relatively straightforward waterfall distribution illustrates that the pre-

=~ed member receives both a preferred rate of return (the interest component)

b f a preferred return on its capital investment (the principal component), even
; ~re any excess cash flow is distributed to the common equity member. Accorda g y, the preferred member has tremendous leverage because it will either receive
thpreferred rate of return when a project is successful or take over full control of
the property if the common equity member fails to pay the preferred return .or if
p e rro1ect is otherwise failing. In the final step of the above waterfall structure, the
~e erred member can negotiate the right to share profits or residual interests after
e preferred equity "borrower" makes all of its mandatory payments to investors.

~deniption Rights
e e. or?anizational documents of these entities normally provide the preferred
f;uity investor with the right of redemption of its entire capital contribution, prelll:red. return, and additional cash flow by an agreed-upon date (similar to the
tur~ty date of a loan). If the common members, who manage the day-to-day
0
t~er~tions, fail to fully redeem the preferred member 's interests by this predeEfmined date, the organizational documents declare that a "Change of Control
A.~~t" has occurred (similar to an event of default in a typical loan transaction).
Ill ough common members might have an opportunity to extend the set date for
Illandatory redemption, a "Change of Control Event" typically gives the preferred
Prembers full day-to-day control of the mortgage borrower and the underlying
operty. Additionallv Fileti (2011 p 1297) contends that some preferred members
seu ma~ [even] have certain 'springing' control rights that give it authority to
in or refinance the underlying real estate asset or exercise full rights of a managg Partner if its position is not redeemed on the anticipated redemption date."
II

JI

I

•
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Moreover, if the common members want to redeem the preferred members'
interests in advance of the redemption date, the preferred members usually receive
some additional compensation (similar to a prepayment premium in a loan). The
amount of this additional fee is often based on whether (and when) the preferred
return or initial investment has been (or will be) paid back. Thus, by including a
redemption provision in the organizational documents of the relevant entity, preferred members can obtain automatic, self-exercising remedies.

Right to Control and Manage
In general, preferred members do not have a day-to-day managerial role and only
have the right to approve major decisions of the entity. For instance, Fileti (2011, P·
1297) asserts that preferred members retain the following approval rights:
[The right] to consent to any additional capital contributions or admission of additional equity holders; to consent to any filing for bankruptcy or appointment
of a receiver; and to consent to major decision such as additional debt; major
contracts; affiliate transactions; mortgage loan prepayments or amendments; refinancing; property management arrangements; and modifications to organizational
documents.
However, in the event of a failed payment of preferred return, or if the common
equity member breaches any provisions of the operating agreement, the preferred
member can acquire full or substantial control of the entity. Because a preferred
member's financing is structured as an equity investment rather than secured debt,
preferred members lack foreclosure rights, but can gain day-to-day control through
enforcing its remedies after a "Change of Control Event." Accordingly, Saft (201lb,
p. 1) reasons that "[i]f the management of the LLC [borrowing entity] fails to pay
the preferred member the promised return, the old management (common members) is ousted and the common members lose their voting rights, dividends, and
right to the distribution of any profit."
Furthermore, in some situations a preferred member can force a sale of the
property or can purchase the common members' stake to become the sole owner
of the underlying property, subject to any outstanding mortgages or other debt
obligations. Thus, similar to mezzanine lenders, once the preferred member takes
control of the mortgage borrower, the preferred member will have effective control
to manage the day-to-day operations of the mortgage borrower and owner of the
underlying income-producing property.

Transfer Rights and Bankruptcy
Senior mortgages often contain due on sale clauses triggered by change of control
or transfers of majority interests in the mortgage borrower. However, Saft (20llb, P·
1) states that this is usually not an issue because "many mortgages permit borrowers to make limited transfers of ownership interests in the property owner without the existing lender's consent, usually so long as certain individuals or entities
retain either a minimum level of ownership and/ or managerial control over the
asset." In order to comply with the senior mortgage and still enforce its preferred
rights under the organizational documents, preferred members should allow the

MEZZANINE DEBT AND PREFERRED EQUITY IN ·REAL ESTATE

179

c.onunon members to retain a minimum level of equity ownership or obtain con~ation from the senior lender that the preferred member is a "Qualified Transferee" for the same reasons as discussed above. If these steps are taken, the preerred member will not have to obtain the approval from the senior lender in order
~o enfo~ce its remedies after a "Change of Control Event" occurs. Further, if the
a orr~wmg entity files for bankruptcy, preferred members typically want to be charcterized as preferred equity holders rather than .as secured debt because they do
~ot Want to be subject to the automatic stay or other constraints imposed under
ankruptcy law.

PREFERRED EQUITY RISKS
As

~isc.ussed in the previous section, because of their unique structure preferred

eq~ity investments offer the preferred member many benefits. Nevertheless, this

unique structure also presents certain risks. This section discusses in greater detail
so:rne of the common risks with preferred equity invest,ments.

t· .
un1tations as a Preferred Equity Member
As discussed in the previous section, preferred members do not normally receive
any ~~ecial collateral. Rather, they have to rely on only the specific contractual
erovisions contained in the organizational documents between the common memer(s) and preferred member(s). Although preferred members have contract rights
:d re~edies, Fisch et al. (2011) warn that the preferred member's ability to enforce
Files~ rights and remedies can be quite complex, slow, and uncertain. For instance,
threti (2011, p. 1297) states that" a [preferred member] may need to enforce its rights
d ough contractual and partnership-type remedies that may involve squeezep owns; buy-sell provisions; conversion from non-managing member (or limited
r ar~er) to managing member (or general partner) status; fiduciary principles;
~quirements for state court dissolution; and other complications." Even determing Whether a contract provision or a "Change in Control Event" has been breached
~an .res~lt in time-consuming and costly litigation. Accordingly, because preferred
pquity investors have no rights to collateral or any security interest to foreclose,
referred equity investors usually have greater exposure to risk than mezzanine
1enders.

Limitations on the Right to Receive Cash Distributions
: return for its investment, a preferred member obtains preferred shares of equity
th d a preferred rate of return. The preferred member acquires a senior position to
p ~common member to any cash distributions (only after the debt service has been
c a.J.d). Budgins (2008) contends that preferred equity investments are particularly
a~~y to the common members (mortgage borrower) due to int.e rnal interest rates
ca h g~ as.20 percent. Although preferred members have a right to receive regular
al s( distributions in respect to its senior position to the common member, Fass et
of. ~Oll) assert that preferred members are generally unsecured and r~ below all
A e b?rrower's creditors, including the mortgage lender and mezzanine lenders.
ccordmgly, given these structural drawbacks, a preferred equity member is likely
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to receive its preferred rate of return and repayment of its original investment
only if the underlying real estate project meets its initial projections and generates
sufficient cash flow after paying off outstanding debt obligations.

Limitations under the Senior Loan
As discussed in the previous section, many senior mortgages prohibit a change in
the control of the mortgage borrower and/ or a transfer of more than 50 percent of
the equity therein. Spyksma (2011. p. 110) asserts that mortgage lenders, especially
if the mortgage loan is destined for a securitization, want to enforce strictly
these approval rights because the mortgage lender is rightly concerned with the
financial wherewithal and the "operational capacity and experience" of the new
equity holders. The mortgage lender usually includes restrictive covenants and
default provisions limiting the ability for a preferred member to take over control
of the mortgage borrower after a "Change of Control Event" occurs. If a preferred
member obtains control of the mortgage borrower as a result of a "Change in
Control Event," this is likely to trigger an accelerated default clause under the
senior mortgage.
However, Saft (201lb. p. 1) proposes that "[w]hile a preferred equity structure
may potentially run afoul of the ownership transfer restrictions often contained
in senior mortgage documents, many mortgages permit borrowers to make ll.tn·
ited transfers of ownership interests in the property owner without the existing
lender's consent, usually so long as certain individuals or entities retain either a
minimum level of ownership and/or managerial control over the asset." Further·
more, a preferred member can also obtain confirmation from the mortgage lender
in advance that the preferred member is a permitted "Qualified Transferee."

Bankruptcy Risks
In a bankruptcy proceeding of the borrowing entity, a preferred member will gen·
erally be treated as an equity investment. Nevertheless, if a preferred member dis·

plays characteristics of a creditor (e.g., requiring the borrower to pledge collateral
in return for the investment), a bankruptcy court may recharacterize the preferred
equity transaction into a loan and the preferred member as an unsecured creditor.
Additionally, if the mortgage borrower files for bankruptcy, the preferred me~
ber has the added risk of substantive consolidation. Substantive consolidation is
an equitable doctrine that characterizes separate legal entities as a single-debtor
entity. Therefore, a court would possibly not only treat preferred equity investment
as debt, but a bankruptcy judge might also order substantive consolidation of the
"separate" entities, and the automatic stay would restrict a preferred member's
ability to enforce its right to control the borrowing entity. Berman (2005, p. 120)
concludes that
preferred equity investors are perhaps unrealistically confident that their transaction documents are actually enforceable, that a bankruptcy court would not order
the substantive consolidation of borrower's assets with another bankrupt debtor or
void certain transfers as a fraudulent p reference, and that the lenders and investors
can effectively and quickly enforce their rights and remedies under the transaction
documents and obtain control of the underlying property.
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~ccordingly, although a preferred member may be able to enforce certain control
rights, this member also faces the risks of recharacterization, substantive consolidation, and the automatic stay.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Thi~ chapter has discussed two types of nontraditional real estate financings: mez-

zan~e loans and preferred equity investments. Although each of these financing
Vehicles is structured differently (one as debt and the other as equity), both allow
pr~pe_rty owners to obtain funds in excess of the typical senior mortgage loan and
to limit the amount of its own equity at risk in a real estate project. Given the unique
s~cture of these financings, real estate owners are able to substantially change the
capital stack and its cost of funds. With these opportunities come risks for both the
real estate owners and lenders/investors.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What is the rationale for choosing mezzanine loans over traditional junior mortgages?
2
· Discuss the legal structure of mezzanine loans. Why are mezzanine loans sometimes
considered to combine aspects of debt and equity transactions?
3
· Discuss why developers and senior lenders like mezzanine loans.
4
· In the event that a mezzanine borrower defaults, identify the remedies available to a
mezzanine lender. Discuss the risks that the mezzanine lender faces when enforcing its
remedies.

~iscuss the structure of preferred equity investments. How do they differ from mezza-

S.

~ne loans? How can a preferred equity member gain managerial control of the underlying property?
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